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CONTRACTS AND SALES 
] oseph Curtis* 
CoNTRAcrs 
The contract cases reaching the Supreme Court of Appeals in this past 
year covered a wide area of subject matter, a listing of which would ap-
proximate the table of contents of a contracts casebook. Voidability, im-
possibility, illegality, assignments, third-party beneficiary, and specific per-
formance are the issues passed upon, and while perhaps there are no startling 
innovations of law or great strides in development of legal concepts re-
sulting from the Court's pronouncements, there is much strengthening of 
accepted views in the Court's forthright statements of position. 
A. Covenants in Restraint of Trade 
Employers who seek to restrain competitive activities of employees fol-
lowing termination of the employment are cautioned to stay well within 
their needs in defining the scope of the restrictions if the covenant is to be 
effective for the purpose. The caution is flagged by the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals in Richardson v. Paxton Co.1 
Employer was engaged in the business of selling marine and industrial 
supplies, paints, chemicals, and services. Employee was schooled in the 
technical skill and special knowledge required for handling and selling 
a particular manufacturer's products for which employer was area dis-
tributor. Employee was assigned the primary responsibility for the sale 
of these products, and his duties included appraising jobs and selecting and 
supervising application of the chemicals to be used in performance. When 
employer's distributorship was terminated by manufacturer, employee 
withdrew from his employment and thereafter accepted a position as sales 
representative of manufacturer for the same area wherein he had served 
employer. Employer secured the distributorship for another chemical pro-
ducer whose products were comparable to the line sold by manufacturer. 
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LLM., 1948, 
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As a term of his employment contract with employer, employee had 
agreed not to "enter or engage in any branch of marine or industrial sup-
plies, equipment, services business" for three years after termination of 
his employment within an area encompassing that where he now served 
manufacturer. Employer's suit to enforce the covenant was successful in 
the circuit court. 
Reversing the chancellor's decree, the Supreme Court found the pro-
hibition against engaging in any branch of activities relating to any kind 
or type of marine or industrial supplies, equipment, or service to be too 
broad to be enforced and to embrace activities in which employer was not 
even engaged. Applying the generally accepted rule that a restriction is un-
enforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade if it is greater than needed 
to protect the employer's business interests or unduly harsh in curtailing 
the employee's opportunities to earn a livelihood, the Court held this one 
to be remiss in both respects. 
Nor was employee enjoined from engaging in such activities as might be 
harmful to employer's business interests and within the scope of the 
covenant. vVhen such covenants fail, "it is commonly because, like the dog 
in the fable, they grasp too much, and so lose all." 2 
B. Restoration Necessary To Enable Contract Avoidance by Incompetem 
[W] here a contract with an insane person has been entered into in 
good faith, without fraud or imposition, for a fair consideration, of 
which the incompetent has received the benefit, without notice of 
the infirmity, and before an adjudication of insanity, and has been 
executed in whole or in part, it will not be set aside unless the parties 
can be restored to their original position.3 
This basic rule was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals in Edmunds v. Chandler."'- Confronting the Court was the issue 
whether absolute and literal restoration of the competent party is required 
to constitute the status quo which would enable the incompetent to avoid 
the contract. 
The incompetent had granted leases for quarrying purposes, and her 
subsequently appointed committee sought to rescind them. The lessee's 
changes in position encompassed (I) payment of the consideration, (2) 
additional expenditures made in procuring the lease agreements, (3) services 
performed in effecting a beneficial sub-lease 'vith a quarrying company 
and persuading it to operate the incompetent's premises instead of other 
property leased to it, and ( 4) declining to lease his own dairy farm to a 
2. 4 L.Q. REv. 241 (1888). 
3. 29 AM. ]u&.lnsane Persons§ 95 (1960). (Foomotes omitted.) 
4. 203 Va. 772, 127 SE.2d 73 (1962). 
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competitor quarry operator out of regard for the sub-lessee quarry company. 
Lessee contended that he could not be placed in status quo since the op-
portunity to lease his dairy farm could not be restored. The Court said 
that this item was too speculative to be considered in placing him in status 
quo, and that in any event it appeared that the opportunity to make the 
lease was unavailed of because of lessee's relationship with the sub-lessee 
company and not because of the lease of incompetent's property. Affirming 
the chancellor's decree, the Court found the restoration adequate in the 
return to lessee of the consideration paid and an additional allowance to 
cover the expenditures mentioned in item (2) above. Further, it denied 
the lessee compensation on a quantum meruit basis for the services of item 
(3), there being no evidence of the value of those services or that the 
additional allowance given him was not sufficient to embrace them. 
The requirement of restoration of the consideration as a condition of 
rescission is not universal.5 The weight of authority in this country, how-
ever, supports the requirement when the other party had no reasonable 
cause to know of his co-contractor's incompetency, and it is clear that 
the Edmunds case offers no support for the opposing view in Virginia. 
The Court makes it equally clear, however, that the restoration need 
not be absolute and literal but only such as the equities of the situation 
demand. 
C. Surety's Liability To Pay Principal's Laborers and Materialmen 
The Court of Appeals indulged in no quibbling when presented with an 
opportunity to expound on the absoluteness of the undertaking of a build-
ing contractor's surety to pay unpaid laborers and materialmen. In Phoenix 
Ins. Co. v. Lester Bros.,6 a lax materialman failed to resort to a special source 
available for the payment of his claim, failed to file a claim against the con-
tractor's bankrupt estate, failed to file a timely mechanics lien, and failed 
to notify the surety on the contractor's bond of the non-payment of his 
claim. The Court held that none of these omissions could serve the surety 
as a defense to the third-party beneficiary materialman's action on the bond. 
With regard to the failure to seek payment from the special source, the 
Court found no duty on the part of the materialman to do so, since it had 
not been a party to the agreement whereby the source became available. 
As for notice, the surety was a principal debtor and not a guarantor entided 
to such. And, although acknowledging that the release of collateral security 
by a creditor without the consent of the surety would operate to discharge 
the surety, the Court viewed the omissions of materialman in failing to file 
claim against the bankrupt estate and to file a mechanics lien as not constitut-
5. See 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 254 (3d ed. 1959). 
6. 203 Va. 802, 127 S.E.2d 432 (1962). 
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ing an affinnative release of the collateral security. Categorically stated by 
the Court, the obligation of a surety on a building contractor's bond, un-
qualified in terms, is a primary, unconditional, and absolute undertaking 
which may be enforced by a claimant for labor or material charges without 
first exhausting other remedies. 
D. Remedying Defects Is "The Last of Work" 
Although the surety's liability may be absolute if not qualified, of course 
it can be tempered by express conditions, and in American Sur. Co. v. 
Zoby,7 the giving of written notice within ninety days after the date on 
which the last of a claimant's work or labor was performed was made 
a condition precedent to the claimant's right of action on the bond. The 
question in the case was whether "the last of the work or labor" was done 
by a plumbing and heating subcontractor when defective work was com-
pleted and an invoice submitted to the general contractor, or not until the 
defective work was thereafter remedied by the subcontractor. The defec-
tive work was completed and invoice submitted for 15,000 dollars in late 
February, but the subcontractor thereafter worked throughout the summer 
at a cost to him of over 10,000 dollars in making good the defects. The 
required written notice of his claim was given to the surety in November, 
which was 'vithin ninety days of the completion of the remedial work. 
Holding that the running of the ninety-day period commenced only upon 
completion of the corrective work, the Court said that until the work had 
been done properly the subcontractor would not have been entitled to de-
mand payment of the general contractor or the surety and thus there was 
no occasion to give them the required notice.. It distinguished prior con-
trary cases on the fact that the additional work done in those cases was of 
a minor and inconsequential nature in comparison with the total work 
performed by the claimant. As noted above, the additional work done in 
this case extended over many months and entailed substantial cost. 
E. Failure To Obtain Act of Third Party as a Defense 
Where there is no evidence that could support an affirmative finding by 
the jury on a matter, an instruction which permits them to speculate on 
it is reversible error. In Foreman v. E. Caligari & Co.,8 the jury's specula-
tions were invited by the lower court's instructions on defenses of mistake, 
mitigation of damages, and impossibility. The defendant's own 'vitness 
denied making any mistake, and no one had testified that one was made. 
There was no evidence that plaintiff had failed to do anything which 
would have avoided or mitigated his loss, and there was none to show that 
7. 204 Va. 325, 130 S.E.2d 587 (1963). 
8. 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963). 
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it was inherently impossible for defendant to supply the materials which 
he had promised. Although defendant's performance may have depended 
upon the consent or act of a third party, his promise was absolute and not 
conditional upon obtaining such consent or act, and his non-performance 
is not then excused by his failure to obtain it. On these findings, the Court 
of Appeals reversed the judgment for the defendant, which may have re-
sulted from the jury's deliberation on these matters, and remanded the 
case for a new trial. 
F. Specific Enforceability Despite Technically Late Tender 
In equity, as contrasted with law, the granting of specific performance 
of contracts for the sale of real estate is the rule and not the exception, and 
time, absent express limitation, is not regarded as of the essence. Both of 
these distinctions were observed by the Court of Appeals in Sims v. 
Nidiffer,9 where it held that a late tender of performance by the vendee did 
not permit the vendor to rescind and granted the former specific per-
formance of the contract. Evidence that the parties did not regard time as 
of the essence lay in the terms of the contract itself as well as in the conduct 
of the parties. The contract established the time of settlement as February 
I, "or as soon thereafter as the title could be examined and the papers pre-
pared." On March 6 it was agreed that settlement would be made on Aprill, 
later extended to April 3. Despite no compliance by vendee on that date, 
the note and deed of trust which vendee was to execute were delivered by 
vendor's agent to vendee for execution on April 5. Vendor did not attempt 
to rescind until the executed note and deed of trust were tendered by 
vendee on April 8. Furthermore, the vendee had been in possession of the 
subject property for about a year, and had made substantial payments on 
the price and some improvements to the property. 
Adhering to its pronouncements in Hamilton v. Newbold,1° the Court 
said that even if the vendee had been in default for failure to settle on the 
agreed date, the vendee's possession, part payment, and improvements, 
coupled with vendor's treatment of the contract as in force up to the time 
of tender by the vendee, would preclude vendor's rescission. Thus, posses-
sion, payment, and improvements serve not only to take an oral contract 
for the sale of realty out of the Statute of Frauds, but to bring a written 
one into the zone of specific enforceability, some delinquency of the vendee 
notwithstanding. 
G. Payment of Negotiable Note Without Obtaining Its Surrender or 
Cancellation 
In the absence of notice of an assignment given to an obligor, his full 
9. 203 Va. 749, 127 S.E.2d 85 (1962). 
10. 154 Va. 345, 153 S.E. 681 (1930). 
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performance rendered to the original obligee operates as a complete dis-
charge of his obligation, albeit the unknowing assignee is in possession of 
the unsurrendered instrument which records the obligation.H However, 
an instrument may be of such a nature as to require its surrender in order 
to effect a discharge of the obligation which it represents, and an obligor 
who fails to obtain that surrender enjoys no such protection. This marked 
distinction between the rights of an ordinary contract assignee and those 
of a holder in due course of a negotiable note is again brought to light in 
American Security & Trust Co. v. John J. Juliano, Inc.12 The maker's 
good faith payment made to the original payee without obtaining surrender 
of the note proved to be of no avail as a defense to the innocent pledgee's 
subsequent action on the note. The Supreme Court of Appeals found no 
basis for an agency existing between the payee and pledgee and held, in 
reversing the circuit court decree, that payment to one who does not have 
the obligation in hand is made at the payer's risk that such one had authority 
to receive the payment on behalf of the holder. 
SALES 
Express and implied warranties in sales transactions received comprehen-
sive treatment by the appellate courts, federal and state, in this period. The 
significance of the time elapsed between purchase and injury and the ap-
plicability of the parol evidence rule to oral and implied warranties, as 
well as the complexities of repossession upon default by a conditional 
sales vendee, were accorded considerable attention. But perhaps the most 
noteworthy of the issues passed upon in the sales area was that of the liability 
of a retailer for defective manufacture when he sells a product as his own 
brand. 
A. Unmerchamable Despite Fiftee12 Momhs of Good Use 
A comprehensive case involving warranties and negligence in the sales 
of goods to consumers came before the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. In Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.p plaintiff's case 
ran the gamut from express warranty through the two implied warranties 
of quality and on into negligence. 
Mter fifteen months use, a stepladder collapsed under the purchaser, 
causing substantial personal injuries. Plaintiff's witness testified that the 
ladder's collapse was due to a defectively headed rivet which connected a 
brace between two of the legs. The district court had held that the fifteen 
months of normal use, without apparent defect, established that the ladder 
11. REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs S 167 (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs S 433 (3d ed. 
1960). 
12. 203 Va. 827, 127 S.E.2d 348 (1962). 
IS. 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962). 
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was reasonably adapted to the purposes for which it was sold and negated 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or negligence in the 
course of manufacture. The circuit court concluded that this accorded 
too much weight to the buyer's fifteen months good use of the ladder. 
The time element is a factor to be considered, acknowledged the Court, but 
only in relation to all the other facts in the case showing negligence, and it 
is not to be regarded as conclusive except where there are no other facts 
tending to show a breach of duty. 
The opinion covers a wide number of issues concerning warranties and 
negligence in sales transactions. Among the propositions for which it may 
serve well as additional precedent is that although a buyer's particular 
intended use of a product may be made known to the seller, no warranty 
of suitability for that special use will be implied where the buyer acts 
substantially upon his own judgment in the selection of the product. An-
other is that defective manufacture will be imputed to the retail seller if 
he puts a product out as his own without indicating that it has been manu-
factured by another and if the seller is not known to be doing only a 
retail business. 
B. Oral Warranties and the Parol Evidence Rule 
The parol evidence rule is perhaps nowhere more frequendy applied than 
in cases of alleged oral warranties in sales of goods and merchandise. It is 
generally accepted that the rule excludes proof of express oral warranties 
if the written contract states that there is no warranty except as may be 
contained therein, and also where, although there is no such statement, the 
writing contains express warranties which concern the same attributes of the 
goods as do the alleged oral ones.14. Even where there are neither exclusion-
ary statements nor express warranties in the written instrument, extrinsic 
evidence of express oral warranties is usually excluded if the writing pur-
ports to represent the whole agreement of the parties.l5 
There is some authority to the effect that a written contract containing 
no warranty precludes the implication of one. Support for that position in 
Virginia is found in International Harvester Co. v. Smith16 and in Ford 
Motor Co. v. SwitzerP The great weight of opinion, however, is otherwise 
with regard to implied warranties, and in this area application of the parol 
evidence rule is usually restricted to negating only such implied warranties 
as would be inconsistent with those expressed in the written contracts. 
In 1945 the Virginia Court of Appeals adopted the majority view in 
14. See 1 \VIU.ISTON, SALES§ 215 (rev. ed. 1948). 
15. VoLD, SALES§ 92 (2d ed. 1959). 
16. 105 Va. 683,54 S.E. 859 (1906). 
17. 140 Va. 383, 125 S.E. 209 (1924). 
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Greenland Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Prods. Co.,18 holding that its state-
ments in the two previously mentioned cases were dicta and that it was 
therefore free to adopt "the more liberal rule." 
In this year's case of Bolling v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,19 the de-
fendant, conditional sale vendee, asserted a cross-claim to a bill in equity 
for enforcement of the written contract, pleading breach of an express 
oral warranty. During argument before the chancellor, defendant sought 
to show the existence and breach of an implied warranty. The Court 
of Appeals held that the evidence of the implied warranty was properly 
excluded by the chancellor as at variance \vith the pleadings and that, as 
the written contract provided that only the manufacturer's "new car" 
warranty would apply to the truck purchased by defendant, the express 
oral warranty was excluded by the written warranty. Once again the 
force of the parol evidence rule is brought to bear upon express oral warran-
ties where the written contract of sale is manifestly complete upon its 
face. The asserted implied warranty, having already fallen on the variance 
defect, did not come in for consideration by the Court in this light. 
C. "Public Auction" Conducted by Unlicensed Auctioneer 
A conditional sales vendor who, without legal process, repossesses and 
sells personal property upon the vendee's default may not have a deficiency 
judgment against the vendee.20 The Virginia statute so providing further 
declares that such repossession and sale operates to cancel and fully dis-
charge the amount secured by the contract. An exception is made, however, 
where the repossessed property is sold at public auction, and the question 
before the Court in Associates Discount Corp. v. Lunsford21 was whether, 
in order to constitute a "public auction," the auctioneer must be licensed 
as required of auctioneers by state Ia,v.22 
In this case the sale had been conducted by an employee of the 
vendor's assignee who was not a licensed auctioneer, and the circuit court, 
in denying vendor's right of recovery, held that therefore it was not a 
public auction within the exception. The Court of Appeals reversed, reason-
ing that the license requirement is not intended to protect the public but 
is solely to raise revenue and that the matter of licensing thus concerned 
only the state and the auctioneer, not third parties. All other requisites to 
meet the public auction exception having been met, the Court remanded 
and directed judgment for the vendor's assignee. 
18. 184: Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 801 (1945). 
19. 204 Va. 4, 129 S.E.2d 54 (1963). 
20. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 55-93 (Repl. Vol. 1959). 
21. 204 Va. I, 128 S.E.2d 924 (1963). 
22. VA. ConE ANN.§ 54-792 (Repl. Vol. 1958). 
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D. Transfer of Title to Repossessed Vehicle "by Operation of Law" 
The sale of personal property and transfer of ownership are normally 
handled by a bill of sale, but automobiles are subject to a special statutory 
treatment. As a general rule, a change in the ownership of an automobile 
is not consummated until there is an assignment and delivery of the 
certificate of title.23 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. TrusseJJ2-i not only 
supports this proposition, but in addition it approves a statutory exception 
in cases where the transfer of title is effected by operation of law. A dealer 
sold a used car under a conditional sales contract to one Bowman and 
thereafter assigned the contract to the Home Finance Company. When 
Bowman defaulted on the payments, the finance company repossessed the 
car, obtaining from Bowman a release, a request for private sale, and a 
power of attorney. It failed, however, to obtain the title papers. Despite 
the fact that it had no certificate of title with which to effect the transfer, 
the finance company was able to resell the car, and within a short time the 
vendee became involved in an accident. In the ensuing action for damages, 
it became necessary to determine whether title was in the finance company 
at the time of the accident so as to render its insurer liable for the vendee's 
negligence. 
With regard to the second sale of the car, the insurer argued that the 
vehicle was not "registered" at the time of the sale, that the registration 
laws are applicable only to "registered" vehicles, and that the delivery 
of the car and the bill of sale effected a transfer of title under the general 
law of sales. The court made short shrift of this argument by stating: 
"To say that Virginia title law, passed specifically to effectively regulate 
the transfer of automobiles, could be avoided altogether by simply failing 
to ever register the automobile would seem to fly in the face of the clear 
purpose of the statute." 25 
Having concluded that no title could have passed from the finance 
company to the second vendee, the court turned to the question whether 
the finance company had title at the time of the accident even though 
there was no certificate of title registered in its favor. Section 46.1-93 
allows special relief for transferees "in the event of the transfer by opera-
tion of law of the title ... ," naming among other events producing such 
a transfer, "repossession upon default in the performing of the terms of ... 
[an] executory sales contract .... " 26 The court concluded that under 
this provision a transfer of ownership to the finance company was effected 
by operation of law at the time the repossession took place. 
23. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 106 S.E.2d 588 (1959); VA. CoDE Atm. 
S 46.1-87 (Repl. Vol. 1958). 
24. 208 F. Supp. 154 (WD. V:a. 1962). 
25. Id. at 159. 
26. VA. ConE ANN. S 46.1-93 (Rep!. Vol. 1958). 
